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Retroactive Taxation: United States v.

Carlton--The Taxpayer Loses Again!
RONALD Z. DOMSKY*

The Power To Tax Retroactively Is The Power
To Destroy Without Warning.'
INTRODUCTION

With the Republicans' resurgence of power, the issue of taxation has
once again received renewed attention. Surprisingly, the debate about
taxation has included a discussion and several proposals about retroactive
taxation. This renewed interest can be attributed to two factors: First, the
oppressive nature of retroaction taxation2 which captured taxpayers'
attention in President Clinton's Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, 3 and second, the Supreme Court's refusal to limit the legislature's
power to tax retroactively.4 Consequently, taxpayers have applied pressure
so that the legislature will curb this abuse of power.5
Recently, Senator Paul Coverdell introduced a constitutional amendment that would prohibit retroactive taxation.6 Also, the new majority in
the House of Representatives has changed the voting rules on taxation.7

* B.B.A., University of Wisconsin; J.D., University of Wisconsin; Professor, John

Marshall Law School. The author thanks Gregory M. Ewers, a student at The John Marshall
Law School for his assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Cf McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 327 (1819). "An unlimited
power to tax involves, necessarily, a power to destroy; because there is a limit beyond which
no institution and no property can bear taxation." Id.
2. "Every law that takes away, or impairs, rights vested, agreeably to existing laws,
" Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S.
is retrospective, and is generally unjust; and may be oppressive ....
(3 Dall.) 386, 391 (1798). As a general rule, a law should not operate retroactively. Id.
3. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
the United States Code).
4. The Supreme Court has not stricken a retroactive tax law since 1928. See
Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440 (1928).
5. J. Mark Ramseyer and Minoru Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the Protection
Racket: A Reply to Professors Graetz and Kaplan, 75 VA. L. REV. 1155, 1171 (1989).
6. Ernie Freda, Congress: The First 100 Days at a Glance, At. Const., Jan. 6, 1995.
7. See, e.g., Ronald Brownstein, Start of Debate Also Begins War to Win Voters, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 5, 1995.
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First, the House rules change requires a three-fifths majority of the House to
increase income taxes.' Second, the rule change bars retroactive tax increases
even if three-fifths of the House were in favor of a retroactive tax bill.9
In Part I, this article will address the pros and cons of retroactive taxation
and ultimately conclude that retroactive taxation is manifestly unfair. Part II
will discuss the United States Supreme Court's latest decision on retroactive
0 Part III will
taxation, UnitedStates v. Carlton.1
discuss the ramifications of
the Carltondecision and whether any constitutional protections remain.
I. THE PROS AND CONS OF RETROACTIVE TAXATION
A. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST RETROACTIVITY

For the purpose of this article, retroactive laws are "those which take
away or impair vested rights acquired under existing laws, create new
obligations, impose a new duty, or attach a new disability in respect to the
transactions or considerations already past.""
The justification for
abolishing retroactive taxation has taken many different, but interrelated
forms.
Perhaps the most egregious aspect of retroactive taxation is that it
destroys the purpose that statutory law should serve as a guide to individual
behavior. 2 Congress constantly changes the tax code 3 and the taxpayer
is obligated to discover and adhere to these changes. However, because of
the Internal Revenue Service's interpretations of the tax code sections,
taxpayers are rarely certain of all actions the IRS takes. Even if a statute is
clear on its face, the IRS can always ask Congress to clarify the legislation,

8. Id. (as opposed to a simple majority vote).
9. Lloyd N. Cutler, Super-Majority Simple-Mindedness, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 1995
(contending that this rule change is "manifestly unconstitutional").
10. 114 S. Ct. 2018 (1994).
11. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1317 (6th ed. 1990). This article does not draw a
distinction between retroactive and retrospective tax legislation. But see Gregory J. DeMars,
Retrospectivity and Retroactivity of Civil Legislation Reconsidered, 10 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
253, 254-57 (defining both retrospective and retroactive and asserting that a difference
exists). However, DeMars concedes that "[w]hile some scholars have noted that a difference
may exist between the terms retroactive and retrospective, most courts and commentators
treat the terms as synonymous." Id. at 254.
12. Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive
Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692, 693 (1960); cf Stephen R. Munzer, Retroactive Law,
1977 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 392 (1977). "Yet a retroactive law is not so impoverished an
instrument as a simple retroactive command." Id.
13. 26 U.S.C. §§ 0.01-8023.
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and thus, retroactively change the law to adhere to the IRS interpretation. 4
Closely related to the principle that taxation should guide behavior is
the reliance/expectation interest compelled by the code. "[A] person should
be able to plan his conduct with reasonable certainty of the legal consequences." 15 Retroactivity often defeats reliance and penalizes a taxpayer
for acting in a manner which was
previously permitted.' 6 This is both
7
harsh and frequently inequitable.'
Another criticism of retroactive taxation is the potential for abuse of the
legislative process.' Because Congress can pass a retroactive statute with
an exact knowledge of who will be affected, 19 Congress can target discrete
groups upon which to either confer a tax break2' or increase their tax
burden. Therefore, retroactive taxation further distorts the legitimacy of the
legislative process. 2' "[T]o the extent that a group can be powerful
because its individual members can vote, contribute, or otherwise act on
22
their own, these members need to know their interests in order to act.,
Thus, Congress, in general, will focus retroactive taxation on unidentifiable
groups who cannot quickly
organize and prevent the passage of the
23
retroactive tax measure.
Another problem faced by tax advisors is the gambling that tax
planners must do when an effective date is announced.24 Even if a tax
planner can guess which laws will be passed it is virtually impossible for tax

14. United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018 (1994).
15. Hochman, supra note 12, at 692.
16. Note, Setting Effective Dates for Tax Legislation: A Rule of Prospectivity, 84
HARV. L. REV. 436, 439 (1970).
17. Id. "[I]t is impossible to quantify the cost resulting from the loss of taxpayer
confidence in the taxing system due to the perceived inequities produced by retroactivity."
Id. at 441.
18. See Ramseyer and Nakazato, supra note 5. at 1171-72 (positing that taxpayers who
are adversely affected by a proposed tax change will organize if given sufficent time).
19. See Hochman, supra note 12, at 693.
20. See Lawrence Zelenak, Are Rifle Shot Transition Rules and Other Ad Hoc Tax
Legislation Constitutional?,44 TAX L. REV. 563.
21. See Jim Gould, A New Fiscal Bonanza in Tax Policy: The Targeted Retroactive
Tax-TRT, Apr. 8 TAX NOTES 117. Gould sarcastically acknowledges that vast amounts of
revenue could be raised through targeting "disfavored segment[s] of society." Id.
22. Saul Levmore, The Casefor Retroactive Taxation, 1993 J. LEGAL STUD. 265, 281
(1993).
23. Id. at 280.
24. See Clifford L. Porter & John C. Richardson, Retroactivity of Tax Legislation: A
Report by the Committee on Tax Policy, Tax Section, New York State Bar Association, 29
TAX LAW. 21, 25 n.19 and accompanying text (1975).
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advisors to estimate the effective date. 25
Opponents of retroactive taxation also point out that strictly prospective
taxation would also simplify the legislative process.2 6 Under the current
system, the legislature must evaluate each provision to decide whether to
apply it retroactively.2 7 Thus, legislative efficiency is promulgated by
prospective legislation. 2' Despite these legitimate criticisms of retroactive
taxation, the United States Supreme Court, since 1928,29 has consistently
upheld Congress' retroactive tax measures.30
B. THE ARGUMENT FOR RETROACTIVE TAXATION

Congress undoubtedly has wide discretion in its constitutional power
to tax. 31 Early on, the Supreme Court held that the Ex Post Facto
Clause 32 of the Constitution only prohibits retroactive criminal laws and
33
does not prohibit retroactive economic laws.
Thus, the Supreme Court grants Congress great deference with regard
to retroactive taxation. One argument in favor of retroactive economic laws
is that taxpayers are on notice that tax laws are subject to change and thus
have no vested right in the rate of taxation.34 Thus, taxpayers cannot
realistically rely on the status quo because of the inherent uncertainty
encompassed in the tax code. 3 "Nominally prospective taxes can affect
values and upset expectations every bit as much as explicitly retroactive
36
assessments.

25. Id.
26. See Note, supra note 16, at 442.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440 (1928).
30. See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text (reviewing Supreme Court cases
considering retroactive taxation).
31. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. I provides in part: "The Congress shall have Power to
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
Common Defence and general Welfare of the United States."
32. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 provides in part: "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto
Law shall be passed."
33. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386 (1798).
34. See, e.g., Cohan v. Comm'r, 39 F.2d 540, 545 (2nd Cir. 1930). "[The taxpayer]
must be prepared for such possibilities, the system being already in operation. His is a
different case from that of one who, when he takes action, has no reason to suppose that any
transactions of the sort will be taxed at all." Id.
35. Michael J. Graetz, Retroactivity Revisited, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1820, 1823 (1985).
36. Levmore, supra note 22, at 266.
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Undoubtedly, purely prospective tax changes upset expectations.
However, a balance must be struck between legislative change and
reasonable reliance by the taxpayer. 37 The ideal balance is to protect
expectations of which the taxable event has passed.
Another rationale for retroactivity is economic efficiency. 38 Graetz
asserts that because both prospective and retroactive effective dates upset
expectations, "the distinctions commonly drawn between prospective and
retroactive effective dates are illusory. 3 9 Thus, the taxpayer takes the risk
of retroactive change in the tax code.' This argument is closely related
to the idea that the legislature must have the ability to "cure" defects in
legislation." Thus, if taxpayers do not behave according to the legislature's expectations, then the legislature has "ample reason" to retroactively
modify the statute.42
However, these economic arguments rely on the "assumption that the
change in the law itself' is economically efficient.4 3 However, both the tax
code and tax changes are not efficient and this encourages irrational
behavior to reduce taxes. Perhaps one of the most egregious examples was
Knetsch v. United States," in which the taxpayer prepaid interest at the rate
of three and one-half percent per year (when tax rates were as high as
ninety-one percent) in order to purchase annuity contracts yielding a return
of only two and one-half percent (to be realized in later years when the
taxpayer presumably would be in a lower tax bracket).45 The idea that
economic efficiency should be utilized in retroactive taxation and not other
areas lessens the economic argument for retroactivity. There must be a
point at which transactions are free from retroactive tax legislation and that
point should be immediately after the taxable event has passed.

37. Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1992).
38. Graetz, supra note 35, at 1824-25.
39. Id. at 1822.
40. Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax
Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 47, 65 (1977). "The risks of a change in law do not seem
necessarily different in kind nor in magnitude from the risks of a change in market demand
or technology." Id.
41. For a discussion of the curative nature of retroactivity, see infra notes 92-94 and
accompanying text.
42. See Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 TEX. L. REV. 425,
430 (1982).
43. Graetz, supra note 40, at 72.
44. 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
45. Id. at 362-63.
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not overturned a retroactive
taxation case since 1928.46 Taxpayers have unsuccessfully challenged
retroactive taxation based upon the Contract Clause,4 7 the Direct Taxation
Clause,48 and the Equal Protection Clause.49 Thus, it appears that the
only viable constitutional attack remaining is a challenge under the
Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. ° What exactly
violates due process in the field of retroactivity is not clear, but as a general
rule, Congress will rarely be deemed to have violated the Due Process
Clause under the current scrutiny of economic legislation.5 '
52

II. UNITED STATES V. CARLTON

The facts of Carlton illustrate the inequities of Congress' ability to
retroactively apply taxes. On December 10, 1986, Jerry Carlton, Willametta
Day's executor, bought 1,500,000 shares of MCI stock at $7.47 per share. 3
On December 12, the executor sold the shares at $7.05 per share to MCI's
Employee Stock Option Plan ("ESOP"), thus losing $631,000 on the
transaction.' The ESOP deduction has been statutorily defined as "the
value of the taxable estate shall be determined by deducting from the value

46. Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440 (1928).

See also Note, supra note 16, at

442.
47. Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146 (1938). "Taxation is neither a penalty imposed
on the taxpayer nor a liability which he assumes by contract." Id. at 146. The Contracts
Clause states, "No State shall ...

pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts

U.S......
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
48. Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15 (1931). The Direct Taxation Clause states,
"No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or
Enumeration herein before directed to be taken." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
49. Welch, 305 U.S. at 146. The Equal Protection Clause states, "No State
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For an in-depth discussion of unsuccessful constitutional
challenges, see Andrew G. Schultz, Note, Graveyard Robbery in the Omnibus Budget
ReconciliationAct of 1993: A Modern Look at the Constitutionalityof Retroactive Taxes, 27
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 775, 779-86 (1994).
50. The four most recent attacks on retroactive taxation heard by the United States
Supreme Court have been decided on Due Process grounds. See United States v. Carlton,
114 S.Ct. 2018 (1994); United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558 (1986); Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp. v. Gray, 467 U.S. 717 (1984); and United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292

(1981).
51.
52.
53.
54.

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Gray, 467 U.S. 717, 734 (1984).
114 S. Ct. 2018 (1994).
Id. at 2021.
Id.
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of the gross estate an amount equal to 50% of the qualified proceeds of a qualified sale of employer securities."55 In filing the decedent's
estate tax return,
56
Carlton included the deduction for the ESOP loss.
On January 5, 1987, the IRS issued an advance version of Notice 87-1357
which asked for clarifying legislation on the interpretation of § 2057. 5' The
IRS also stated it would require that the decedent owned the securities prior to
death in order to get the deduction.59 On February 26, 1987, a bill was
introduced to amend § 2507' and this bill was eventually enacted on
December 21, 1987.6 The new bill required that to be eligible for the
deduction, a seller must own the stock before death. 62 Thus, not only did the
Day's estate lose $631,000 on the transaction, but the estate was also denied
the ESOP deduction. 3
A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION

The Ninth Circuit held that Congress' retroactive estate tax violated due
process.'
In doing so, the Ninth Circuit developed a two-part test "to
determine whether the retroactive application of a tax is unduly harsh and
oppressive." 65 The first part was whether the taxpayer had actual or
constructive notice that the statute would be retroactively amended.' The
court examined "two passing references in Congressional documents" that the
government contended that Congress intended to require "decedent ownership" and concluded that Carlton did not have actual or constructive knowl67
edge.

55. 26 U.S.C. § 2057(a). Thus, the gross estate was reduced by $5,287,500
($7.05/share x 1,500,000 million shares x .50).
56. Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir. 1992).
57. 1987-1 C.B. 432 (1987), enacted as Pub. L. No. 100-103.
58. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1054.
59. Id.
60. Section 2057(d)(1)(A) requires that "the decedent directly own[] the securities
immediately before death." Section 2057 was repealed for estates of decedents who died
after december 19, 1989. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, § 7304(a), 103
Stat. 2352.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 1992) (2-1 decision).
65. Id. at 1059.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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The second prong of the test was whether the taxpayer reasonably and
detrimentally relied upon the code. 6' The court rejected the government's
argument that "any reasonable taxpayer would have known it was 'too good
to be true."' 9 The court stated that "[w]e flatly reject the government's
premise that a taxpayer cannot rely on the clear and unequivocal text of the tax

code, but instead must speculate on the unspoken and inchoate intentions of
Congress."70
Moreover, the court noted that Carlton's reliance was reasonable in light
of Congress' favorable treatment of ESOP's in general.7' Last, the court
rejected the government's argument that Carlton was unreasonable because
Carlton should have concluded that "Congress had made a drafting error."72
The court then examined Whether the taxpayer detrimentally relied upon
the tax code.73 The government argued
that Carlton's reliance was not
74
"truly detrimental" for two reasons.
First, the government argued that the retroactive amendment simply
restored the taxpayer to the position she would have been in had Congress
not erred. 75 The court rejected that argument since the estate lost $631,000
76
on the sale at a discount to the ESOP.

Second, the government contended that the sale at a discount was not
a statutory prerequisite to the deduction, so the loss should not be considered in determining whether the retroactive amendment violates due
process.77 The court rejected this argument and concluded that the sale at
a discount was a "necessary concession to complete the deal. 78
The government also argued that the transaction had no substance and
was thus a sham transaction. 79 The court rejected that argument and

68. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1059.
69. Id. at 1060.

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. The court rejected this argument because § 2057 had "first been proposed over
two and a half years before" it was finally passed. Id. Thus, Congress had plenty of time
to make sure the statute included all relevant provisions. Id.
73. Id. at 1061.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. Cf Bridges v. C.I.R., 325 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1963) (stating that "[t]he test of
whether a transaction claimed to furnish the basis of income tax deduction was a sham
transaction was whether what was done, apart from tax motive, was the thing intended by
the statute providing for the deduction."). Id.

HeinOnline -- 16 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 84 1995-1996

1995]

RETROACTIVE TAXATION IN UNITED STATES V. CARLTON

concluded that the transfer in wealth from the estate to the ESOP constituted
substance and reality.'
B. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION

The Supreme Court unanimously overruled the Ninth Circuit's decision, a' and in doing so, eliminated virtually any hope of a taxpayer
successfully challenging retroactive legislation.
1. The Standard of Review: Estate and Gift Taxes versus Income Taxes
Normally, courts review economic legislation under the deferential
rational relationship test.82 However, there were several reasons why the
Ninth Circuit decided that estate and gift taxes should be treated differently
from income taxes with respect to due process analysis.
First, the inherent nature of estate and gift taxes is different from
income taxes.8 3 Additionally, the whole ESOP system is based on
employee ownership which is achieved by tax incentives" such as § 2057.
All things being equal, if ESOP's did not provide a tax advantage, taxpayers
who were planning their estate would dispose of their stock in other ways.
On the other hand, income taxpayers will rarely be confronted with a
situation in which it is more advantageous to forego additional income.
Furthermore, judicial notice of these inherent differences is embodied in the
last successful constitutional challenges based upon retroactivity.8 5 Second,

80. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1061-62.
81. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2018.
82. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). The rational relationship test,
under due process, requires that the legislature have a legitimate state interest and the means
(the legislation) be rationally related to that purpose. Id. at 510-11. Undoubtedly, Congress
has a legitimate state purpose in raising revenue through taxation. To fail the second prong
of the test, the legislation must be "unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious." Id.at 511.
83. See Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 148 (1938) "Similarly, a tax on the receipt of
income is not comparable to a gift tax. We can not assume that stockholders would refuse
to receive corporate dividends even if they knew that their receipt would later be subjected
to a new tax or to the increase of an old one." Id.
84. Ronald L. Ludwig, Design and Purpose ofan ESOP: Techniques, Special Features
and Incentives in Utilizing ESOPS in TAX LAW AND ESTATE PLANNING (PLI Tax Law and
Estate Planning Course Handbook Series No. J4-3678, 1995).
85. See generally Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440, 445 (1928) (invalidating the
first gift tax as to a taxpayer who made a transfer before passage of the legislation but after
the legislation was introduced); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147 (1927) (invalidating
the first gift tax as to a taxpayer who made a transfer before introduction of the legislation);
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86
in 1986, the Court considered a challenge to a retroactive estate tax. 87
process,
While the Court held that the retroactive estate tax satisfied due
the Court conducted an extensive analysis into "the nature of the tax and the
circumstances in which it" was laid. 8 The Court did not specify the
standard of review, but their in-depth analysis seemed to indicate that the
deferential rational relationship test would not be utilized for retroactive
estate and gift taxes.8 9
Nevertheless, the CarltonCourt held that retroactive tax statutes would
be held to the same standard as all retroactive economic legislation--the
rational relationship standard. 90 Moreover, the Court emphatically ended
any differences that may have existed between income taxes and estate and
gift taxes. 9'
In Carlton, Congress' legitimate purpose was to correct a "mistake" in
the original bill by adding a decedent ownership provision. 92 Without the
decedent ownership provision, the anticipated revenue loss would have been
$7 billion instead of the anticipated revenue loss of $300 million originally
contemplated by Congress.
However, the Court's classification of Congress' action being one of
curing a mistake leads to a very slippery slope. One commentator noted
that "[m]any courts and commentators have been especially solicitous of
curative statutes which retroactively correct 'mistakes' in the existing law.
Unfortunately, the distinction between an unintended 9 3benefit and a
repudiated policy judgment is generally difficult to draw.
Nevertheless, even if this had not been curative legislation, the taxpayer
would still not have prevailed. Given the current trend, the Court would
have found that the purpose of "raising revenue" was sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the Due Process Clause. 94 Given the relaxed standard of
the rational relationship test, it is difficult to ascertain what factors, if any,

Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 543 (1927) (invalidating an estate tax as to a decedent
who was required to include in their gross estate the value of transferred property prior to
the passage of the act).
86. United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558 (1986).
87. Id. at 572.
88. Id. at 569.
89. See infra notes 95-112 for a discussion of notice in retroactive tax cases.
90. United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 2022 (1994).
91. Id. at 2024 (stating that the successfully challenged estate and gift tax cases do not
"stand for the proposition that retroactivity is permitted with respect to income taxes, but
prohibited with respect to gift and estate taxes."). Id.
92. Id. at 2022.
93. See Note, supra note 16, at 440.
94. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2025 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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comprise a successful challenge to a retroactive tax measure. The Carlton
court severely curtailed certain factors which had been of analytical
importance in the past.
2. Notice Provisions
The Supreme Court has previously wrestled with the relevance of
notice in challenges based on retroactivity, but the Court has been less than
consistent on the importance of issuing advance notice to the taxpayer.
Consequently, it is not surprising that the Ninth Circuit placed considerable
emphasis on the lack of notice.
In 1981, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Darusmont,95 the
first of the modem-day retroactivity cases. The court assumed, for purposes
of argument, that notice was relevant. 96 Nevertheless, the Court found that
the taxpayer had ample advance notice because both the House and Senate
proposals contained retroactive effective dates.97
In Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Gray,98 the Court also assumed
that notice was relevant. 99 Once again, the Court held that the proposed
legislation with retroactive effective dates provided "ample notice."10°
However, the Court retreated on the idea of a notice requirement by stating
that "[w]e have doubts however, that retroactive application of the MPPAA
[Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980] would be invalid
under the Due Process Clause for lack of notice even if it was suddenly
enacted by Congress without any period of deliberation.''
In United States v. Hemme,1°2 the Court further muddied the waters
on the issue of notice. °3 The Court stated that "[o]ne of the relevant
circumstances is whether, without notice, a statute gives a different and
more oppressive legal effect to conduct undertaken before enactment of the
95. United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292 (1981).
96. Id. at 299.
97. Id. (stating further that the rate increase had been "under public discussion for
almost a year before its enactment").
98. 467 U.S. 717 (1984).
99. Id. at 732.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 731-32. This extends the view that Congress should be able to retroactively
apply measures so that taxpayers will not be able to transfer assets, and thus, diminish the
economic benefit of a change in tax policy. In addition, the MPPAA was enacted into law
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1461.
102. 476 U.S. 558 (1986).
103. Id. Interestingly enough, Hemme involved a challenge to the retroactively overhaul
of gift and estate taxes. Id. at 560.
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statute."' '
However, the Court concluded that the taxpayer "was no
10 5
worse off than" he would have been without the retroactive measure.
Thus, the Court did not extensively consider the importance of notice.
Finally, the Carlton Court put an end to the notice debate.'0° In
Carlton, the taxpayer did not have any type of notice, not even the loose
constructive notice of pending legislation. 7 Nevertheless, the Court held
that lack of notice is not dispositive under due process analysis.'0 8
Conspicuously, however, the Court did not rely on the modem-day
retroactive tax cases.'0 9 Rather, the Court relied on cases that marked the
change in judicial review in economic legislation from the Lochner era."10
Thus, the taxpayer is always on notice that the tax rate may increase."'
Consequently, notice will never inure to the benefit2 of the taxpayer, but can
undermine a successful constitutional challenge."
3. Detrimental Reliance
Similarly, the Carlton Court held that "reliance alone is insufficient to
establish a constitutional violation."" 3 The Court further stated that
"Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the taxpayer nor a liability"
taxation is merely a way of apportioning
assumed by contract." 14 Rather,
5
government."
of
the costs
However, a mere change in the structure of taxation is not enough to
mount a successful challenge." 6 The change in taxation must place the

104. Id. at 569.
105. Id. at 570.
106. 114 S. Ct. 2018 (1994).
107. Id. at 2023.
108. Id.
109. For this proposition, the Court did not rely on any of the three cases decided since
1980: United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558 (1986); Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v.
Gray, 467 U.S. 717 (1984); United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292 (1981).
110. The Court cited Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938) and Milliken v. United
States, 283 U.S. 15 (1931). See also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner
is typical of the Supreme Court's more stringent review of economic legislation in the early
twentieth century.
111. Carlton, 114 S.Ct. at 2023 (citing Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15 (1931)).
112. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Gray, 467 U.S. 717 (1984) (stating that the
taxpayers had "ample notice").
113. Id.
114. Id. (citing Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. at 1466-67).
115. Id.
116. United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558, 570 (1986).
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taxpayer in a worse position than if the retroactive legislation was never
passed.' 7 In Hemme, the Court denied the constitutional challenge
because the taxpayer still paid $655.16 less than if the retroactive legislation
had not been passed."'
4. Sham Transactions
Not only did the Carlton Court employ the deferential rational basis
test, the Court also characterized the transaction as a purely tax-motivated
sham transaction." 9 Consequently, the Court held that Congress acted
reasonably in retroactively amending the tax so that "innocent" taxpayers
would not have to bear the brunt of recuperating the loss in revenue. 2
This characterization further impedes a successful constitutional
challenge. Congress should bear the responsibility of formulating accurate
tax legislation. Justice O'Connor criticized this characterization in her
concurrence in Carlton, noting that because of the inherent nature of
taxation, taxpayers can be expected to employ legitimate tax avoidance
plans.'' Furthermore, this "sham transaction" in Carlton, resulted in a
$631,000 loss to the taxpayer and $631,000 increase in wealth to the
ESOP. 2 Nevertheless, this amorphous concept will certainly be utilized
by the government in any future challenges based on retroactivity.
III. REMAINING CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS

Despite the negative ramifications of the Carlton decision, there are at
least two viable constitutional challenges available to taxpayers. The
Carlton Court severely curtailed the cases that successfully challenged
retroactivity, but the Court did not completely overturn them.

117. Id. at 571.
118. Id.
119. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2022-23.
120. Id. at 2023.
121. Id. at 2024 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "[A] transaction, otherwise within an
exception of the tax law, does not lose its immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to
avoid, or, if one choose, to evade taxation. Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes
shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the
Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes." Id. (citing Helvering v.
Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2nd Cir. 1934) (citations omitted), aft'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
122. Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 1992).
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A. A WHOLLY NEW TAX

One exception that remains from the successful challenges on
'' 23
retroactivity is the prohibition on retroactive "wholly new taxes. 1
Taxpayers have not been successful in using this attack, because the recent
tax changes have only amended the broad categories of income, gift, and
24
estate taxes.
Nevertheless, some current tax ideas, if retroactively applied, might not
survive a constitutional challenge. For example, Congress could not pass
the VAT (value added tax) or a national sales tax on February 1 and then
2
make it retroactive to the first of the year. 1
B. THE RECENT TRANSACTION LIMITATION

Despite the broad discretion Congress possesses within the field of
retroactive taxation, Congress does not have an unlimited time frame within
which it can retroactively tax.' 26 Congress is limited "to short and limited
27
periods required by the practicalities of producing national legislation."'1
The Court has consistently held that it is not per se unconstitutional for a tax
measure to retroactively encompass the entire calendar year in which the
28
statute was enacted.
The longest time frame in which the Court upheld a retroactive measure
was three years. 29 In that case, Welch v. Henry, 30 the Wisconsin legis-

123. United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 2024 (1994). "Blodgett and Untermyer,
which involved the Nation's first gift tax, essentially have been limited to situations involving
"the creation of a wholly new tax."
124. See, e.g., United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 300 (1981) (holding that the
minimum tax is only an "addition to" to the regular income tax and thus, not a wholly new
tax).
125. One state court has examined the question of wholly new taxes: Gunther v.
Comm'r, 487 A.2d 1080 (Conn. 1985). In Gunther, the court examined a tax statute that laid
dormant for twelve years before it was revived retroactively. Id. at 1090. The court held
that due process was not violated because it was not a "new" tax since it had existed at one
time. Id.
126. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2025 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "The government interest
in revising the tax laws must at some point give way to the taxpayer's interest in finality and
repose." Id.
127. Id. at 2026-27 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This principle embraces the idea that
taxpayers should not be able to thwart tax change while the legislation is pending.
128. Id. at 2027 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
129. See Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 141 (1938).
130. 305 U.S. 134 (1938).
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lature increased the taxes for the years 1933 and 1934 in 1935."' However, Welch was exceptional because at that time, the Wisconsin legislature
only met bi-annually in odd-numbered years.' 32
The more likely limitation is two years, measured by the year of
enactment plus the preceding calendar year.'33 A valid retroactive measure "must be taken to include the receipt of income during the year of the
legislation session preceding that of its enactment."'3 Since legislatures
meet annually, two years would be the limit. "A period of retroactivity
longer than the year preceding the legislative session in which the law
enacted would raise, in my view, serious constitutional questions."' 35
CONCLUSION

The Carlton decision seriously undermines many of the arguments put
forth by taxpayers challenging retroactive taxation. Nevertheless, a few
attacks remain that may prove successful in future challenges. Unfortunately
for the taxpayer, apparently the best protection against retroactive taxation
is legislative self-restraint.

131. Id.
132. Id. at 150.
133. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2025 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Thus, at the outer limits,
the enactment date would be Dec. 31, 19Xl and the retroactive effective date would be Jan.
1, 19X0.
134. Welch, 305 U.S. at 150.
135. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2026 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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